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"I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was forever fixed at
the Philadelphia convention. The true miracle was not the birth of the
Constitution, but its life, a life nurtured through two turbulent centuries of
our own making."
-Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall'
1. THE U.S. CONSTrruTION AND FASCINATING FACTS ABOUT IT 4 (Robert F. Tedeschi, Jr.
ed., Ist ed. 1993).
1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Immunity, by definition, is a permanent exemption from proceeding
with a legal duty. 2 A maxim of law holds that words of exemption are not to
be construed to import any liability.3 However, privilege has been defined as
a particular benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person or class, beyond the
common advantages of ordinary citizens.4 Additionally, a privilege is known
as
[a]n exemption from some burden or attendance, with which cer-
tain persons are indulged, from a supposition of law that the sta-
tions they fill, or the offices they are engaged in, are such as require
all their time and care, and that, therefore, without this indulgence,
it would be impracticable to execute such offices to that advantage
which the public good requires. 5
This broad definition of privilege is the basis of President Clinton's
argument against Paula Jones. These differences between "immunity" and
"privilege" will be apparent as the United States Supreme Court decisions
and reasons for each are examined herein.
This article distinguishes the concepts of executive immunity from
executive privilege, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, in an
attempt to provide guidance for those interested in understanding the
arguments advanced in Jones v. Clinton.6 Part II of this article begins by
examining the early arguments for executive immunity. Part II also conducts
an in-depth review of the history of Supreme Court decisions and policy
justifications affecting the executive immunity doctrine.
After reviewing the currently applicable Nixon immunity cases, this
article examines the history of Supreme Court decisions involving executive
privileges. Although few Supreme Court decisions have concerned execu-
tive privilege, the procedure of claiming an executive privilege parallels
those arguments advanced in support of President Clinton's claim of a
2. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 751 (6th ed. 1990).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1197.
5. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1077 (5th ed. 1979).
6. 72 F.3d 1354, 1363 (8th Cir.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir.),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996) [hereinafter Jones Il] (holding that President Clinton is
not temporarily immune from civil process, from discovery through trial, during his tenure as
President of the United States).
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"temporary immunity." Part IV of this article presents the facts and argu-
ments advanced in Jones, from the trial court to the Supreme Court. In
addition, the holdings and rationales advanced in both the trial and appellate
courts are surveyed.
After concluding that President Clinton does not have a constitutionally
sound claim for presidential "immunity," Part IV of this article argues that
the relief sought by President Clinton is more akin to the term presidential
privilege. Finally, Part V examines the issues of whether the trial court has
the discretion to stay the trial of the President, and whether the President or
the plaintiff should bear any burden of proof.
II. THE HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE IMMUNrTIs
Immunities are codified in both state and federal constitutions, statutes,
and the common law.7 First, a state or federal statute may provide a person
immunity from prosecution, immunity from particular testimony, or immu-
nity in exchange for incriminating testimony.8 The most notable form of
common law immunity is the doctrine of sovereign immunity, "which
protects local, state, and federal governments from suit." 9 The historical
roots of common law immunity can be traced back to the English maxim,
'the King can do no wrong." °  Second, the United States Constitution
enumerates certain governmental immunities. Specifically, Article I, section
6 of the United States Constitution, which contains the Arrest Clause and
Speech or Debate Clause, states that:
The Senators and Representatives shall ... in all Cases, except
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Ar-
rest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in
any other Place."
7. See William F. Allen, Note: President Clinton's Claim of Temporary Immunity: Con-
stitutionalism in the Air, 11 J.L. & PoL. 555, 558-60 (1995).
8. Id. at 558-60.
9. Id. at 558.
10. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1033
(5th ed. 1984) (citations omitted); see e.g. R.J. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47
CAL. L. R .303, 311 (1959).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
1997]
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Although immunity has been granted to the legislative 2 and judicial 13
branches of government, this paper is confined to the examination of
immunities extended to the executive branch.
The roots of executive immunity can be found in the English common
law and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 14 "While the latter doctrine -
that the 'King can do no wrong' - did not protect all government officers
from personal liability, the common law soon recognized the necessity of
permitting officials to perform their official functions free from the threat of
suits for personal liability. ' '15 "In general, there is no executive immunity -
common law or otherwise - from criminal prosecution."' 16
Some commentators argue "that the Constitution's provision of im-
peachment as a means of removing 'civil Officers' bars any indictment or
prosecution of impeachable officials until after their removal."' 7 Regardless,
in Marbury v. Madison,18 Chief Justice John Marshall authored the most
often cited rule that "[t]he very effence [sic] of civil liberty certainly confifts
[sic] in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to
12. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 628-29 (1972) (holding both congres-
sional aides and members of Congress immune under the Speech or Debate Clause for actions
which lead to illegal resolutions); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 184-85 (1966)
(holding that judicial inquiry into the substance and motivation of a congressman's speech
was in violation of the Speech or Debate Clause); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379
(1951) (holding that the civil rights statute did not create civil liability for acts by committee
and individual members of Congress during their legitimate legislative activities).
13. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1978) (holding that informal pro-
ceeding does not deprive a judge of absolute immunity from damages liability); Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (holding state court judges absolutely immune from civil suits
based on constitutional grounds pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims); Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 357 (1871) (holding that judges are absolutely immune for acts commit-
ted within their judicial jurisdiction).
14. Laurier W. Beaupre, Note, Birth of a Third Immunity: President Bill Clinton Secures
Temporary Immunity From Trial, 36 B.C. L. REv. 725, 729 (1995); Jennifer L. Long, Note,
How to Sue the President: A Proposal for Legislation Establishing the Extent of Presidential
Immunity, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 283, 292 (1995); Michael T. Matraia, Note, Running For Cover
Behind Presidential Immunity: The Oval Office as Safe Haven from Civil Suits, 29 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 195, 199 (1995); Theodore P. Stein, Nixon v. Fitzgerald: Presidential Immunity as
a Constitutional Imperative, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 759, 762 (1983); Gray, supra note 10, at
305.
15. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239 (1974) (citations omitted).
16. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-14, at 268 (2d ed. 1988).
17. Id.
18. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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afford that protection.,' 9  Consequently, "[t]he Supreme Court has long
recognized a federal common law immunity protecting executive officials, in
the absence of congressionally-created exceptions, from civil liability to
private plaintiffs arising out of acts performed 'in the discharge of duties
imposed upon [such officials] by law."' 20  Initially, two public policy
arguments were established for extending immunity to executive officials.
This immunity,
apparently rested, in its genesis, on two mutually dependent ratio-
nales: (1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of
subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obli-
gations of his position, to exercise discretion; [and] (2) the danger
that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to exe-
cute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by
the public good.2'
A. The Supreme Court's Early Immunity Cases
Although the United States Constitution enumerates executive powers
and duties vested in the President, it falls to specifically impart any special
privileges or immunities upon the executive. 22  Although "presidential
immunity is mentioned neither in the Constitution nor in any statute, it did
prove a topic for debate among early statesmen."23 "John Adams and Oliver
Ellsworth argued that 'the President, personally, was not the subject to any
process whatsoever,' reasoning that to do otherwise would allow the courts
to 'stop the whole machine of Government."' 24 Nonetheless, "Charles
Pinckney argued that the framers deliberately chose not to grant the Presi-
dent immunity because they 'well knew how oppressively the power of
undefined privileges has been exercised in Great Britain, and were deter-
mined no such authority should ever be exercised here."'5 "The absence of
19. Id. at 163.
20. TRME, supra note 16, at 269 (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896)).
21. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240 (citations omitted).
22. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II (memorializing the President's powers and duties).
23. Beaupre, supra note 14, at 731.
24. Id. (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 750 n.31 (1982) (citing W. MACLAY,
ThE JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY 167 (1890 ed.))).
25. Id. at 732 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 777 (1982) (White, J., dis-
senting) (citing 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 72 (1800))).
19971
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Constitutional authority left the creation of an American immunity doctrine
where it had been in England: in the courts. 26
In 1866, in Mississippi v. Johnson,27 the United States Supreme Court
faced the issue of whether an injunction could restrain the President from
carrying into effect an act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional.2' The
State of Mississippi filed a bill to enjoin Andrew Johnson and his officers
from executing two acts of Congress, commonly called the Reconstruction
Acts.29 In President Andrew Johnson's defense, Attorney General Stanbery
argued that, due to the office which the President holds, the President is
immune from service of process or the jurisdiction of any court. 30 Stanbery
continued:
There is only one court or quasi court that he can be called upon to
answer to for any dereliction of duty, for doing anything that is
contrary to law or failing to do anything which is according to law,
and that is not this tribunal but one that sits in another chamber of
this Capitol. There he can be called and tried and punished, but not
here while he is President; and after he has been dealt with in that
chamber and stripped of the robes of office, and he no longer
stands as the representative of the government, then for any wrong
he has done to any individual, for any murder or any crime of any
sort which he has committed as President, then and not till then can
he be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts. Then it is the indi-
vidual they deal with, not the representative of the people.
31
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase distinguished the
performance of a ministerial duty from the exercise of discretion.32 The
Court concluded that "the duty of the President in the exercise of the power
to see that the laws are faithfully executed ... is in no just sense ministerial.
It is purely executive and political. 33 The Court held that, "this court has no
jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties. ' 34  Although the Court never addressed the issue of whether the
26. Id. at 732-33 (citations omitted).
27. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
28. Id at 498.
29. Id. at 475.
30. Id. at 484.
31. Id. at 484-85.
32. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 498-99.
33. Id at 499.
34. Id. at 501.
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President is immune from service of process or jurisdiction, "some com-
mentators broadly interpreted Johnson to mean that the President is immune
from legal process when performing what he deems to be his constitutional
duties. 35
In United States v. Lee,36 the issue concerned whether an action could
be maintained against the defendants, who were military officers and
executive officials of the United States, for the possession of approximately
1000 acres, known as Arlington estate.37 George W. P. C. Lee, the original
plaintiff, devised this land to his daughter, the wife of General Robert E.
Lee, for life, and after her death to the plaintiff. The United States pur-
chased the land in controversy at a tax sale and retained possession of the
property for more than ten years. Frederick Kaufman and Richard P. Strong,
defendants, were tax commissioners in charge of the certificate of sale to
Arlington estate, and both defendants were under orders from the secretary
of war. The orders included that part of the property was to be used for a
military station, and the rest, for a national cemetery to bury deceased
soldiers and sailors, today known as the Arlington Cemetery.38 The case was
first decided in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District
of Virginia, and the jury found the tax certificate and sale did not divest the
plaintiff of his title to the property.39 Attorney General Devens argued on
appeal that the courts had no jurisdiction over the subject in controversy, by
reason of official immunity, and that "all the proceedings be stayed and
dismissed.. .. "40
Writing for the United States Supreme Court, Justice Samuel F. Miller
stated:
The defense stands here solely upon the absolute immunity from
judicial inquiry of every one who asserts authority from the execu-
tive branch of the government ....
[However,] [n]o man in this country is so high that he is above
the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with
35. JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONmSTIUTIONAL LAW § 7.1, at 235 (5th ed.
1995).
36. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
37. Id at 199.
38. Id. at 198.
39. l at 199.
40. Id. at 198.
1997]
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impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to
the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
41
The Court went on to affirm the decision of the circuit court, further
stating that a court's "power and influence rest[s] solely upon the public
sense of the necessity for the existence of a tribunal to which all may appeal
for the assertion and protection of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and
by the laws of the land .... 42
The arguments advanced in these early immunity cases laid the founda-
tion for a judicially-created executive immunity doctrine. "Understanding
the importance of the immunity doctrine as applied to the President requires
an analysis of currently existing immunity law and its historical founda-
tions."43
B. Supreme Court Development of Executive Immunity
The scope of the immunities extended to the executive branch were
"traditionally quite broad and protected the defendant even in cases that
undoubtedly involved tortious behavior."44 Federal courts granted immunity
to the executive branch based on the judicial immunity developed in Bradley
v. Fisher.45 "Just as the judicial system could not function if judges feared
lawsuits.. . the executive branch could not function if officials could not act
in the public interest without fearing liability."
46
1. Absolute Immunity
Originally, the federal courts took a broad, liberal view of immunity
when executive officers were sued under state law claims, "holding that in
such cases the federal officers held an absolute immunity for acts within the
scope of their discretion." 47 This tolerant approach to the executive immu-
nity doctrine extended protection, "even for malicious actions if those
actions were deemed to be within the 'outer perimeter' of the federal duty.
48
41. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220.
42. Id. at 223.
43. Long, supra note 14, at 292.
44. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 131, at 1032. he idea was that... social values of
great importance required that the defendant escape liability. The immunity thus might be
thought to differ from a privilege .. " Id.
45. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
46. Beaupre, supra note 14, at 734.
47. KEETONET AL., supra note 10, § 132, at 1060.
48. Id.
[Vol. 21:969
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 6
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss3/6
Williams
Thus, absolute immunity permanently bars a plaintiff's civil damages claim
regardless of the official's underlying motive.49 Originally, "[h]igh-ranking
executive branch officials donned the judge's absolute immunity cloak in
1896.1"50
In Spalding v. Vilas,51 the issue was whether the head of an executive
department, here the Postmaster General, was liable for damages on account
of official communications made within his authority, pursuant to an act of
Congress, due to the personal or malicious motive which prompted his
action. 2 An attorney representing local postmasters in a salary dispute
alleged that the Postmaster General maliciously sent letters to the attorney's
clients with the intent to circumvent and prevent the attorney from recover-
ing his fees. 3
Writing for the Court, Justice John M. Harlan proclaimed:
We are of opinion that the same general considerations of public
policy and convenience which demand for judges of courts of supe-
rior jurisdiction immunity from civil suits for damages arising from
acts done by them in the course of the performance of their judicial
functions, apply to a large extent to official communications made
by heads of Executive Departments when engaged in the discharge
of duties imposed upon them by law. The interests of the people
require that due protection be accorded to them in respect of their
official acts.54
As with judicial immunity, the Court continued to distinguish between
actions taken by an executive department head which are "manifestly or
palpably beyond his authority" and actions taken within the executive's
discretion or authority under *the law.55 The Court went on to hold that an
executive department head was not liable for a civil suit predicated on
actions taken within the official's authority.56 The Court reasoned that, in
49. Matraia, supra note 14, at 204.
50. Beaupre, supra note 14, at 734.
51. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
52. Id. at 484. See also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871) (holding
that judges of courts of general jurisdiction are absolutely immune from civil suits for judicial
actions within the court's jurisdiction, and, therefore, any exercise of that jurisdiction cannot
be affected by any consideration of the motives with which the acts are done).
53. Spalding, 161 U.S. at 487-88.
54. Id. at 498.
55. Id.
56. Id.
1997]
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keeping within the limits of one's authority, an executive department head
"should not be under an apprehension that the motives that control his
official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil
suit for damages," because to do so would "cripple the proper and effective
administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch ....
The preceding policy argument was the underlying proposition and main
justification for the Supreme Court's extension of immunity to executive
branch officials.
In Barr v. Matteo,58 the issue was whether the absolute immunity
granted to executive department heads should be extended to lower ranking
executive officials.59 Two employees from the Office of Rent Stabilization
sued the Acting Director, William Barr, for defamation based on the issu-
ance of a press release in which its publication and terms originated by
reason of the Acting Director's malice.6° Linda A. Matteo and John J.
Madigan, the two employees, devised a plan to spend $2,600,000 of agency
funds earmarked for terminal-leave payments, whereby agency employees
would be discharged, paid their terminal-leave, rehired immediately as
temporary employees, and later restored to permanent status.61 The text of
the press release included comments that William Barr would demand the
resignations of employees who took cash leave settlements because he
violently opposed it. He charged that his first official act as director would
be to ferret out and suspend these employees.
62
Writing for a plurality, Justice John M. Harlan reasoned that Barr's
action was within the "outer perimeter of... [his] line of duty," and was "an
appropriate exercise of the discretion which an officer of that rank must
possess if the public service is to function effectively. 63 Thus, the Court
extended absolute immunity beyond executive department heads to execu-
tive officers generally. 64 While applying this functional approach to immu-
nity, Justice Harlan added a third policy argument for extending immunity to
57. Id.
58. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
59. Id. at 569.
60. Id. at 565.
61. Id. at 565-56. Various senators referred to the plan as "'a highly questionable proce-
dure,' a 'raid on the Federal Treasury,' 'a conspiracy to defraud the Government of funds,'
and as 'definitely involv[ing] criminal action."' Id. at 567 n.4 (citation omitted).
62. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 567 n.5.
63. Id. at 575.
64. Id. at 574; see also TRIBE, supra note 16, at 269 n.5 (explaining that immunity rules
extend beyond "'executive officers of cabinet rank,"' protecting executive officers generally).
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executive officials when he stated that damage suits "would consume time
and energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental ser-
vice .... ,,65 This policy argument is the main trust of President Clinton's
justification for extending presidential immunity to protect an incumbent
President from most civil legal process, from discovery through trial.
2. Qualified Immunity
Beginning in the 1970s, many immunity cases involved allegations of
state and federal officers violating federal laws." The Civil Rights Act was
the main source for claims alleging violations of constitutional rights.67
When an officer violated a federal constitutional right, the Supreme Court
provided protection for the officer but qualified the immunity granted. 68
Originally, qualified immunity had a subjective element. Today, the plaintiff
is required to establish a violation of "statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known. 69
In Pierson v. Ray,70 three policemen of the City of Jackson arrested and
charged ministers, who were members of a group of fifteen white and Negro
Episcopal clergymen, with violating Mississippi law for "attempt[ing] to use
segregated facilities at an interstate bus terminal.' The ministers were
eventually convicted of the offense by Judge Spencer.72 Following their
convictions, the ministers instituted a lawsuit alleging that the police officers
and the judge had violated the Civil Rights Act and the common law of
Mississippi for false arrest and imprisonment. 3 At issue was whether the
police officers and judges were immune from liability for damages actions
under the Civil Rights Act.74
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren reasoned that Congress
never indicated that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which effects all people who under
color of law deprive another of his civil rights, would "abolish wholesale all
65. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 571; see also Stein, supra note 14, at 764 (adding a third policy
justification for extending the immunity doctrine to federal executive officials generally).
66. KEFTON ET AL., supra note 10, at 1060-61.
67. Id. at 1061.
68. Id.
69. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
70. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
71. IMt at 549.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 550.
74. Id. at 548.
1997]
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common-law immunities.",75 Writing on judicial immunity, Warren further
reasoned,
[T]his Court held in Tenney v. Brandhove .... that the immunity of
legislators for acts within the legislative role was not abolished.
The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role is equally
well established, and we presume that Congress would have spe-
cifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.76
Consequently, the Court held Judge Spencer absolutely immune from
damages liability for his role in these convictions.77 Nevertheless, the Court
stated that "[t]he common law has never granted police officers an absolute
and unqualified immunity....,,s
The police officers argued that they should not be liable for acting in
good faith and with probable cause while making an arrest under a statute
that they believed to be valid.79 The Court reasoned that "[p]art of the
background of tort liability, in the case of police officers making an arrest, is
the defense of good faith and probable cause., 80 For the first time in the
Supreme Court, police officers were afforded a qualified immunity in actions
alleging constitutional violations.
[T]he defense of good faith and probable cause.., available to the
officers in the common-law action for false arrest and imprison-
ment, is also available to them in the action under [42 U.S.C.] §
1983.... We agree that a police officer is not charged with pre-
dicting the future course of constitutional law.
81
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,82 the issue concerned whether a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment by a federal agent acting under color of law gives rise to a damages
cause of action. 3 Allegedly, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
carried out an arrest of Webster Bivens and a search of his apartment,
75. Ray, 386 U.S. at 554.
76. Id. at 554-55 (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 553.
78. Id. at 555.
79. Id.
80. Ray, 386 U.S. at 556-57.
81. I. at 557.
82. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
83. Id. at 389.
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without a warrant and using unreasonable force.84 The Court reiterated that
the "Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal
power .... ,,85 Although the United States Supreme Court never ruled on the
immunity issue, the Court repeated the declaration made in Marbury v.
Madison, that "'[tihe very effence [sic] of civil liberty certainly confifts [sic]
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever
he receives an injury."' 8 6 The Court held that an alleged violation of the
Fourth Amendment by federal officials gives rise to a cause of action for
damages.87
The case was remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, where the appellate court fashioned a two-step test to
determine whether official actions were within the established immunity
doctrine.88 First, it must be determined whether the officials were acting
"within the outer perimeter of [their] line of duty." 89 If so, were they
"performing the type of 'discretionary' function that entitles them to immu-
nity from suit[?]" 90 The court of appeals determined that the agents were
acting within the scope of their duty, but rejected the claim of immunity
because the agents were not engaged in the performance of a discretionary
act.91
Writing for the court, circuit Judge Medina went further and established
a partly subjective, partly objective defense to claims against officers
charged with violating one's constitutional rights.92 Subjectively, the
officials must allege and prove that they acted in good faith.93 Objectively,
officials must have a reasonable belief in the validity of their actions. 94 "By
asserting violations of constitutional rights as the basis for their suits,
litigants stripped the absolute immunity defense from executive offi-
cials... [,]" spawning a new era for the doctrine of immunity, titled quali-
fied immunity.
95
84. Id.
85. Id. at 392.
86. Id. at 397 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
87. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
88. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d
1339, 1343 (2d Cir. 1972).
89. Id. at 1343.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. ILd. at 1348.
93. Bivens, 456 F.2d at 1348.
94. Id.
95. Beaupre, supra note 14, at 736.
1997]
13
Williams: Temporary Immunity: Distinguishing Case Law Opinions for Executiv
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
In Scheuer v. Rhodes,96 the personal representatives of the estates of
three students who died on the campus of Kent State University brought
various damage actions under the Civil Rights Act against the Governor of
Ohio, the Adjutant General of the Ohio National Guard, various other
National Guard officers, and the University president.97 These officials were
charged with allegedly acting under color of state law by intentionally
causing the deployment of the National Guard with orders to perform illegal
acts.98
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger stated:
Ex parte Young teaches that when a state officer acts under a state
law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes
into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he
is in that case stripped of his official or representative character
and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity
from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."99
After an analysis and rejection of the common law absolute immunity
afforded officials, Chief Justice Burger went on to say:
[Q]ualified immunity is available to officers of the executive
branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the
scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the cir-
cumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on
which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reason-
able grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis
for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in
the course of official conduct.'0
Chief Justice Burger supplied a three-step analysis for courts to apply
when addressing issues of qualified immunity for state officials.'0 ' First, a
96. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
97. Id. at 234.
98. Id. at 235.
99. Id. at 237 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)). "Ex parte
Young... involved a question of the federal courts' injunctive power, not, as here, a claim for
monetary damages." Id. at 237-38.
100. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247-48.
101. Id. at 250.
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court must determine whether the official was acting within the scope of his
duties. 10 2 Second, the court must decide whether the official acted within the
"range of discretion permitted [to] the holders of such office.. ." under the
law.103 Finally, the fact-finder must determine whether the official acted in
the good faith belief that his actions were within the law.1°4
In the instant case, the Court ordered that the case be reversed and
remanded so the lower court could make a finding of good faith.105 But,
"after Scheuer, lower federal courts applied varying standards, unsure of
whether a government official must satisfy an objective test, a subjective
test, or both."' 6  Scheuer represents the first time the Supreme Court
departed from the all-or-nothing approach under absolute immunity, seeking
a more balanced approach, by weighing the competing policy interests
affecting executive immunity, with the recognition of qualified immunity.
According to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.:
Scheuer established a two-tiered division of immunity defenses in
§ 1983 suits. To most executive officers Scheuer accorded quali-
fied immunity. For them the scope of the defense varied in pro-
portion to the nature of their official functions and the range of de-
cisions that conceivably might be taken in 'good faith.' This
'functional' approach also defined a second tier, however, at which
the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-notably judges
and prosecutors-required the continued recognition of absoluteimmunity.1°7
In Butz v. Economou,10 8 the plaintiffs filed suit against federal officials
within the Department of Agriculture claiming that the investigation and
administrative proceeding, to revoke or suspend plaintiffs' registration, was
in retaliation for criticism of the Department and in violation of federal
constitutional rights. 09 The defendants moved to dismiss the action on the
102. ld.
103. Id.
104. Id. See also Matraia, supra note 14, at 210 (reciting the holding that qualified im-
munity applies if the official acted in good faith and believed that the actions taken were
within the law).
105. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 250.
106. Matraia, supra note 14, at 210.
107. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,746 (1982).
108. 438 U.S. 478 (1978), aff'd sub nom. Economou v. United States Dep't of Agric.,
633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980).
109. I& at 480.
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grounds of official immunity arguing that all federal officials are absolutely
immune from any liability for damages, even if in the course of enforcing the
law, they violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights." ° Writing for the
Court, Justice Byron R. White reexamined the history of immunity. Justice
White stated that "[t]he immunity of federal executive officials began as a
means of protecting them in the execution of their federal statutory duties
from criminal or civil actions based on state law."'' The Court distin-
guished Barr"2 and Spalding' 3 on the ground that neither suit involved the
liability of officials who had exceeded their constitutional limits, as was the
case here." 4 Justice White stated the opinion of the Court:
We agree... that, in the absence of congressional direction to the
contrary, there is no basis for according to federal officials a higher
degree of immunity from liability when sued for a constitutional
infringement as authorized by Bivens than is accorded state offi-
cials when sued for the identical violation under § 1983 .... To
create a system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely
the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal officials is
to stand the constitutional design on its head .... If, as the Gov-
ernment argues, all officials exercising discretion were exempt
from personal liability, a suit under the Constitution could provide
no redress to the injured citizen, nor would it in any degree deter
federal officials from committing constitutional wrongs." 5
The Court clarified another element for courts to analyze when the
litigation involves an alleged constitutional violation. First, courts should
determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to a damages remedy for the
particular constitutional violation." 6 Then, courts should "address how best
to reconcile the plaintiffs right to compensation with the need to protect the
decision-making processes of an executive department."' 1 7 Although, the
Supreme Court held that federal executive officials are only entitled to a
qualified immunity for constitutional violations, absolute immunity will be
recognized for those "officials whose special functions require a full exemp-
110. Id. at 483.
111. Id. at 489.
112. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
113. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
114. Economou, 438 U.S. at 495.
115. Id. at 500, 504-05.
116. Id. at 503.
117. Id.
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tion from liability."' 18 In so holding, the Court first ruled that persons
performing adjudicatory functions within federal agencies are entitled to
absolute immunity for their quasi-judicial acts.119 Second, agency officials
who perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor were determined
to be entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their decisions
to initiate or continue proceedings.120 Finally, an agency attorney who
arranges for presentation of evidence in the course of proceedings was
entitled to absolute immunity from suit based on the introduction of such
evidence. 21 The Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion.122
The preceding case law illustrates the extent to which the Supreme
Court rationalized the scope and need for executive immunity. As a result,
the United States Supreme Court has drawn the line of executive immunity
between those acts which fall within a particular official's discretion and
functional responsibilities. In the Nixon immunity cases,1 3 however, the
Supreme Court expanded the scope of immunity for the President of the
United States. Presidential immunity continues to apply to civil actions for
damages, but the Court consciously avoided any application of the functional
approach for the Presidency. Although presidential immunity is limited for
those acts taken within the zone of a President's 6onstitutional duties, the
zone of constitutional responsibilities are interpreted rather broadly. Besides
granting an absolute immunity for President Nixon, the Supreme Court
stated its willingness to extend absolute immunity for certain functions
exercised by executive branch officials.
118. Id at 508.
119. Economou, 438 U.S. at 514. See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)
(holding state court judges absolutely immune from civil suits based on constitutional grounds
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 354 (1872)
(holding judges absolutely immune from civil suit "for malice or corruption in their action
whilst exercising their judicial functions within the general scope of their jurisdiction .... ).
120. Economou, 438 U.S. at 516. See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,427 (1976)
(extending absolute immunity to state prosecutors and holding a state prosecutor immune from
suits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims). The Pachtman Court reasoned that "lilt is the
functional comparability of their judgments to those of the judge that has resulted in both
grand jurors and prosecutors being referred to as 'quasi-judicial' officers, and their immunities
being termed 'quasi-judicial' as well." Id. at 423 n.20.
121. Economou, 438 U.S. at 517. The Economou Court saw no difference between a
prosecutor's function in presenting evidence in a judicial proceeding from that of the agency
attorney presenting evidence in an administrative proceeding. Id. at 516.
122. Id. at 517.
123. The phrase "Nixon immunity cases" refers to Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731
(1982) and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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3. The Nixon Immunity Cases
On June 24, 1982, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,124 an intensely divided
Supreme Court granted the President absolute immunity from all civil
damage claims alleging acts within the "outer perimeter" of the President's
official duties and responsibilities. 125 That same day, the Supreme Court
handed down Harlow v. Fitzgerald,126 in which the Court declined to extend
absolute immunity to presidential aides.127 These Nixon immunity cases
introduce the current law applicable to disputes involving both the absolute
and qualified immunities available to the President and all other executive
officials in general.
The Harlow case actually began in January of 1970, when A. Earnest
Fitzgerald, a management analyst with the Air Force Department, lost his job
during a "departmental reorganization and reduction in force ....,,28 Back
in November of 1968, Fitzgerald "attained national prominence" while
testifying before a Congressional Subcommittee that there were approxi-
mately $2,000,000,000 in cost overruns on a new transport airplane. 129
"Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation for his congres-
sional testimony, the [Congressional] Subcommittee... convened public
hearings on Fitzgerald's dismissal."' 30 After a flurry of media questions
concerning Fitzgerald's termination, President Nixon attempted to reassign
Fitzgerald to the Bureau of the Budget.' 3' In reality, "Fitzgerald's proposed
reassignment encountered resistance within the administration" because of
Fitzgerald's poor loyalty.1 32 As a result, his position was abolished.
133
Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission ("Commission")
which, after a highly publicized closed hearing, concluded that Fitzgerald's
dismissal was grounded on "'reasons purely personal,"' thus the reasons for
"'134his termination were an "impermissible basis for a reduction in force ....
124. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
125. Id. at 757.
126. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
127. Id. at 817-18.
128. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 733.
129. Id. at 734.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 735.
132. Id. at 735-36.
133. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 736-37.
134. Id. at 738 (citation omitted).
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The Commission awarded Fitzgerald back pay and recommended that he be
ordered a new position within the Defense Department.
135
Consequently, "Fitzgerald filed a suit for damages in the United States
District Court ... rais[ing] essentially the same claims presented to" the
Commission.5 6 The complaint was dismissed for all defendants based upon
the statutes of limitations, except for White House aide Alexander Butter-
field. 137 More than eight years after Fitzgerald's initial discharge, Fitzgerald
amended the complaint to include former President Nixon and another White
House aide Bryce Harlow.138 The district court denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment and ruled that President Nixon was not
entitled to absolute immunity. 139 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari after the appellate court summarily dismissed the appeal."40
Writing for a plurality, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. reasoned that since
"[c]onsiderations of 'public policy and convenience' justified "judicial
recognition of immunity from suits arising from official acts," with cases
involving the President, the inquiries into history essentially involve
"policies and principles that may be considered implicit in the nature of the
President's office in a system structured to achieve effective government
under a constitutionally mandated separation of powers."' 41 Justice Powell
focused on two policy issues that raised "unique risks to the effective
functioning of government."' 42 First, "[b]ecause of the singular importance
of the President's duties... there exists the greatest public interest in
providing an official 'the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially
with' the duties of his office.' 43 Second,
[i]n view of the visibility of his office and the effect of his actions
on countless people, the President would be an easily identifiable
target for suits for civil damages. Cognizance of this personal vul-
nerability frequently could distract a President from his public du-
135. Id. at 738-39 n.17.
136. Id. at 739.
137. Id.
138. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 740.
139. Id. at 740-41.
140. Id. at 741.
141. Id. at 745, 748.
142. Id. at 751.
143. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 751-52 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979)).
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ties, to the detriment of not only the President and his office but
also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve.
144
"In view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office and
functions," the Court held that the President is entitled to absolute immunity
against damages liability for acts within the "outer perimeter" of his official
responsibilities.
45
Even though the President was afforded absolute immunity from civil
damages suits, the Court reasoned that the "[n]ation [is not] without suffi-
cient protection against misconduct on the part of the Chief Executive."'
146
The Court specifically identified impeachment as a constitutional remedy for
misconduct by a President, including "formal and informal checks," such as,
"constant scrutiny by the press," "[v]igilant oversight by Congress," the
President's "desire to earn reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an
element of Presidential influence, and a President's traditional concern for
his historical stature."'147 The Court concluded that "[t]he existence of
alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that absolute immunity will
not place the President 'above the law.' For the President, as for judges and
prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy
for alleged misconduct in order to advance compelling public ends."'4 s
However, the plurality opinion was intensely criticized by the dissent-
ers. Writing the dissent, Justice Byron R. White argued:
Attaching absolute immunity to the Office of the President, rather
than to particular activities that the President might perform, places
the President above the law. It is a reversion to the old notion that
the King can do no wrong. Until now, this concept had survived in
this country only in the form of sovereign immunity .... Now,
however, the Court clothes the Office of the President with sover-
eign immunity, placing it beyond the law.
149
Justice White accurately summarized the history of the American common
law doctrine of executive immunity during his rebuttal:
144. Id. at 753.
145. Id. at 756.
146. Id. at 757.
147. Id.
148. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 758.
149. Id at 766-67 (White, J. dissenting).
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The Court's response, until today, to this [immunity] problem has
been to apply the argument to individual functions, not offices, and
to evaluate the effect of liability on governmental decisionmaking
within that function .... The functional approach to the separation-
of-powers doctrine and the Court's more recent immunity decisions
converge on the following principle: The scope of immunity is
determined by function, not office. The wholesale claim that the
President is entitled to absolute immunity in all of his actions
stands on no firmer ground than did the claim that all Presidential
communications are entitled to an absolute privilege, which was
rejected in favor of a functional analysis, by a unanimous Court in
United States v. Nixon.'
50
Harlow v. Fitzgerald'5 ' addressed the scope of immunity available to
senior aides and advisors of the President of the United States involving
lawsuits for damages predicated upon their official acts.1 52 White House
aides Alexander Butterfield and Bryce Harlow were alleged to have joined
former President Richard M. Nixon 53 in a conspiracy to violate constitu-
tional and statutory rights of the respondent A. Earnest Fitzgerald.
15 4
Consequently, Butterfield and Harlow appealed the denial of their immunity
defense independent of former President Nixon.
55
Writing for the Court, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. determined that,
"[o]ur decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two kinds. For
officials whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete
protection from suit, we have recognized the defense of 'absolute immunity.'
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make plain that
qualified immunity represents the norm."'156 Butterfield and Harlow argued
that they were "entitled to a blanket protection of absolute immunity as an
incident of their offices as Presidential aides.' 57 Since the President must
delegate a large measure of authority, they argued that "recognition of
derivative absolute immunity is made essential by all the considerations that
support absolute immunity for the President himself."'15 8 The Court coun-
150. Id. at 784-85 (citation omitted).
151. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
152. Id. at 802.
153. Id. The alleged conspiracy is the same as involved in Fitzgerald. Id.
154. Id. at 802.
155. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806.
156. Id. at 807 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 808.
158. Id. at 810.
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tered by stating that "we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity in
Butz .... In general our cases have followed a 'functional' approach to
immunity law.' 59
Butterfield and Harlow also asserted their entitlement to immunity
based on the "special functions" of White House aides.1 60 To this argument
the Court responded:
For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in such sensitive
areas as national security or foreign policy, absolute immunity
might well be justified to protect the unhesitating performance of
functions vital to the national interest. But a 'special functions' ra-
tionale does not warrant a blanket recognition of absolute immunity
for all Presidential aides in the performance of all their duties ....
In order to establish entitlement to absolute immunity a Presidential
aide first must show that the responsibilities of his office embraced
a function so sensitive as to require a total shield from liability. He
then must demonstrate that he was discharging the protected func-
tion when performing the act for which liability is asserted.16
The Court agreed that if Butterfield and Harlow failed to establish
absolute immunity, public policy "mandates an application of the qualified
immunity standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims
without resort to trial."'162 "Yet.. . the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits
without trial-a factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests
struck by our prior cases-requires an adjustment of the 'good faith'
standard established by our decisions."
' 63
The Court reasoned that "Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides that disputed questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided
on motions for summary judgment. And an official's subjective good faith
has been considered to be a question of fact.., regarded as inherently
requiring resolution by a jury."' 64 Justice Powell explained:
Immunity generally is available only to officials performing dis-
cretionary functions .... [and] the judgments surrounding discre-
tionary action almost inevitably are influenced by the decision-
159. Id.
160. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 811.
161. Id. at 812-13.
162. Id. at 813.
163. Id. at 814-15.
164. Id. at 816.
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maker's experiences, values, and emotions. These variables ex-
plain in part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be de-
cided by summary judgment .... Judicial inquiry into subjective
motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the
deposing of numerous persons, including an official's professional
colleagues. Inquires of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of ef-
fective government. 165
Accordingly, the Court held that "government officials performing
discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statu-
tory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." 166 The Court reasoned that, "[r]eliance on the objective reason-
ableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly
established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit
the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment." 167
The Court fashioned a two-step analysis for issues of qualified immu-
nity on summary judgment. 68 First, the judge should determine what is the
currently applicable law.169 Second, the judge should determine "whether
that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred.' 70 The
Court justified this analysis by stating the following:
If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official
could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal
developments, nor could he fairly be said to 'know' that the law
forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Until this
threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be
allowed.' 7 '
Il. THE HISTORY OF ExEcuTIvE PRIVILEGES
Scholarly literature has associated and combined the term "immunity"
with "privilege," hence an essential prerequisite to any intelligent discussion
165. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816-17.
166. Id. at 818.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
171. Id
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of privilege involves distinguishing privilege from the related doctrines of
governmental immunity.17 2  Primarily, executive privilege is defined as an
executive official's or a President's claim of constitutional authority to
withhold information from the legislative and judicial branches, whereas
immunity, if granted, permanently prohibits a plaintiffs cause of action. 7
3
"The very words 'executive privilege' were conjoined only yesterday, in
1958."'' 7 Just as executive immunity began with arguments that the Presi-
dent was not subject to service of process or jurisdiction, these arguments
were also advanced by Presidents to avoid subpoenas in executive privilege
cases.
175
In addition to a communications privilege, some commentators suggest
that the President has a witness privilege. 176  It is suggested that due to
presidential responsibilities, a President should be excused from actual
appearance, and instead, may give his or her testimony by deposition. 77
However, several Presidents and former Presidents have testified in court
'78and before Congress.
172. 26 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 5663 (1992).
173. RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 1 (1974).
174. Id. at 1.
175. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 35, at 235 n.1.
Subpoenas of the President. Prior to the subpoena of a President upheld in
United States v. Nixon, the courts only twice before issued a subpoena to a sit-
ting President. The first was the subpoena issued to President Jefferson in
United States v. Burr; Chief Justice Marshall, sitting on circuit during the treason
trial of Aaron Burr, was the trial judge. Burr intended to obtain a letter sent to
Jefferson as well as various documents. The extent to which Jefferson complied
is unclear. Jefferson withheld parts of the letter, and Marshall apparently ac-
cepted this withholding. The letter was not introduced in evidence.
On January 3, 1818, President Monroe became the second President to be
served with a subpoena while in office.
Id. (citations omitted).
176. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 172, § 5673, at 58.
177. Id.
178. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 35, at 238-39 n.28.
Ford. In United States v. Fromme, President Ford was compelled to testify
by videotaped deposition at trial of Lynette "Squeaky" Fromme, who had at-
tempted to assassinate Ford. In addition, while President, President Ford volun-
tarily appeared before a House subcommittee to answer questions that had been
raised concerning his pardon of former President Nixon; and on September 15,
1988 Ford voluntarily appeared before a Senate Committee and testified about
the War Powers Resolution, which he criticized as "impracticable" and
"unconstitutional."
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The President has the right to receive confidential communications from
his aides and advisors pursuant to Article II of the United States Constitu-
tion. 179 "[A]lthough the Constitution does not explicitly reference a privi-
lege of confidentiality, to the extent the President's interest in confidentiality
relates to the effective discharge of Executive powers, it is constitutionally
based." 180 -Although the need to protect confidential communications is
derived from the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, executive
privilege is not absolute, but rather a qualified privilege.'
81
Although some commentators thought that executive privilege was first
recognized by the courts in the trial of Aaron Burr,18 2 most writers assert that
the privilege demanded by President Thomas Jefferson during that case was
what is today called "executive privilege."'183 The case most frequently cited
as being the first American decision allowing for the privilege of state
secrets is Totten v. United States.184 "However, a careful reading of Totten
tends to support those who argue that the basis of the decision was the law of
contracts, not the privilege for secrets of state."'
85
"In 1953, in the midst of the worst of the McCarthy hysteria, the
Supreme Court decided United States v. Reynolds, its first and still the
leading case on the state secrets privilege."'8 6  In United States v. Rey-
Carter. During his presidency, President Carter gave videotaped testimony
that was presented at the criminal trial of two Georgia state officials charged with
gambling conspiracy; two years later, President Carter provided videotaped tes-
timony for a grand jury probing charges that Robert Vesco, a fugitive financier,
had enlisted the White House to quash extradition proceedings against him. Also
while President, President Carter was interviewed under oath by the Counsel on
Professional Responsibility pursuant to a Department of Justice order to investi-
gate "for criminal, civil and administration purposes" any offenses resulting from
his brother Billy Carter's relations with the Libyan Government.
Reagan. In United States v. Poindexter, the district court ordered video-
taped deposition of former President Reagan, at the insistence of criminal defen-
dant Poindexter, the former President testified on videotape, which was intro-
duced in the trial, which was part of the series of trials prosecuted by the statuto-
rily created Independent Counsel and growing out of the Iran-Contra affair.
Id. (citations omitted).
179. Andrea L. Wolff, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and the Executive Privilege:
Resolving the Separation of Powers Issue, 5 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 1023, 1040 (1995).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692D) (C.C.Va. 1807).
183. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 172, § 5663, at 505-06.
184. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
185. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 172, § 5663, at 506.
186. Id. at 507-08.
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nolds,187 the Supreme Court granted certiorari "[b]ecause an important
question of the Government's privilege to resist discovery is in-
,188volved .... " A military aircraft took flight to test secret electronic
equipment. 89 While in flight, fire consumed the bomber's engines and
killed six crew members and three civilians in the resulting crash.19° The
widows of the three deceased civilians brought a consolidated suit against
the United States. 191 During discovery, the widows sought production of the
Air Force's official accident investigation report. The Government moved to
quash the request for production on the ground that these matters were
privileged against disclosure.192 After the Government produced the docu-
ments to the judge for a determination of whether they contained privileged
information, the district court declined the claim of privilege and ordered the
documents be produced.193 In the end, final judgment was awarded to the
widows and an appeal followed. 194 The appellate court affirmed, stating
both that there was a sufficient showing of good cause for the production of
the documents and as to the ultimate disposition of the case.1
95
The government's attorney argued to the United States Supreme Court
that executive department heads have the power to withhold any documents
in their custody from judicial view if they deem it to be in the public inter-
est.196 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson reasoned that,
"[w]hen the Secretary of the Air Force lodged his formal 'Claim of Privi-
lege,' he attempted therein to invoke the privilege against revealing military
secrets .... , Ruling on the merits, the Court stated:
[T]he trial judge was in no position to decide that the report was
privileged until there had been a formal claim of privilege. Thus it
was entirely proper to rule initially that petitioner had shown prob-
able cause for discovery of the documents. Thereafter, when the
formal claim of privilege was filed.., there was certainly a suffi-
187. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
188. Id. at 3.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3.
193. Id. at 5.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 6.
197. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6.
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cient showing of privilege to cut off further demand for the docu-
ment.
198
Since there was nothing to suggest that the electronic equipment had
any causal connection with the accident, the Court reversed the decision of
the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court.' 99 Thus, the
Court granted a qualified executive privilege to executive department heads
in civil suits.
In United States v. Nixon,2°° an indictment was issued alleging viola-
tions of federal statutes by certain White House staff and political supporters
of the President. Before trial, the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for a
subpoena duces tecum directing President Nixon to produce certain tapes
and documents relating to precisely identified conversations and meetings
between the President and others.2 1 The President filed a motion to quash
the subpoena, claiming executive privilege.?2 Initially, President's counsel
argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the subpoena, because the
matter was an intra-branch dispute between a subordinate and superior
officer of the executive branch and hence not subject to judicial review.0 3
Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger first
addressed the issue of justiciability. The Court reasoned:
The demands of and the resistance to the subpoena present an ob-
vious controversy in the ordinary sense... [i]n the constitutional
sense, controversy means more than disagreement and conflict;
rather it means the kind of controversy courts traditionally resolve.
Here at issue is the production or nonproduction of specified evi-
dence.., sought by one official of the Executive Branch within the
scope of his express authority; it is resisted by the Chief Executive
on the ground of his duty to preserve the confidentiality of the
communications of the President. Whatever the correct answer on
the merits, these issues are "of a type which are traditionally justi-
ciable ..... Moreover, since the matter is one arising in the regular
198. l at 10-11.
199. Id. at 11-12.
200. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 692.
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course of a federal criminal prosecution, it is within the traditional
scope of Art. IH power. 
2W
Thus, the Court ruled that the Special Prosecutor has standing to
enforce a subpoena duces tecum for the production, before trial, of certain
tapes and documents relating to precisely identified conversations and
meetings between the President and others.
After determining that the requirements of rule 17(c) were satisfied, 205
the Court turned to the claim of executive privilege. 2°M The President's first
argument was that the separation of powers doctrine precluded judicial
review of the President's claim of privilege.207 Additionally, the President
argued that if he does not prevail on the claim of absolute privilege, the
Court should, as a matter of constitutional law, hold that the privilege
prevails over the subpoena duces tecum °2 08 The Court first reiterated a
proposition in Marbury v. Madison, that "it is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.,' 20 9 Accordingly, the
Court concluded that it had the authority in this case to state what the law
was regarding the President's claim of privilege.210 Turning to the second
argument, Chief Justice Burger reasoned:
To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute
privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal
statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public interest
in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions
would upset the constitutional balance of 'a workable government'
and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. 111.211
204. Id. at 696-97 (citation omitted).
205. See United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). In order to require
production prior to trial, the moving party must show: 1) that the documents are evidentiary
and relevant; 2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by
exercise of due diligence; 3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such
production and inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may
tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and 4) that the application is made in good faith and is
not intended as a general 'fishing expedition.' Id. at 338.
206. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
210. Id. at 705.
211. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.
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The Court held that a general claim for the privilege of confidentiality
of presidential communications must be weighed against the effects which
this particular exercise of privilege would bear against the effective func-
tioning of the judicial process.21 2 However, the Court proceeded to justify
the invocation of a qualified, presumptive privilege.
A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alter-
natives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and
to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except pri-
vately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive
privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is funda-
mental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in
the separation of powers under the Constitution ....
But this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of
our historic commitment to the rule of law. This is nowhere more
profoundly manifest than in our view that "the twofold aim [of
criminal justice] is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suf-
fer. . . ." To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the func-
tion of courts that compulsory process be available for the produc-
tion of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the de-
fense .... Nowhere in the Constitution... is there any explicit ref-
erence to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest
relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers, it is con-
stitutionally based.213
After weighing the competing interests at stake, the Court concluded
that President Nixon's generalized interest in confidentiality of communica-
tions does not prevail over fundamental demands of due process of law in
the fair administration of criminal justice:214
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,21 5 President Nixon, after
his resignation, entered into an agreement with the Administrator of General
Services that provided for the storage of an estimated 42 million pages of
documents and 880 tape recordings. Under the agreement, neither President
Nixon nor the General Services Administration ("GSA") could gain access
to the materials without the other's consent.216 Just after a public an-
nouncement of this agreement, a bill was introduced in Congress designed to
212. Id. at 707-08.
213. Id. at 708-11 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
214. Id. at7ll-13.
215. 433 U.S. 425 (1977) [hereinafter General Services].
216. Id.
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invalidate it.217 Approximately three months later, this bill was enacted as
the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act ("Act") and was
signed into law by President Gerald Ford.218 The Act directs the Adminis-
trator of GSA to take custody of President Nixon's materials and have them
screened by Government archivists.219 The purpose was to return to Presi-
dent Nixon those materials, personal and private in nature, and to preserve
those having historical value.220 This Act would make important materials
available for use in judicial proceedings subject to "any rights, defenses or
privileges which the Federal Government or any person may invoke., 221
The day after the Act was signed into law, President Nixon filed an
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the
Act by challenging the Act's constitutionality on the grounds that it violates:
1) the principle of separation of powers; 2) the Presidential privilege; 3)
President Nixon's privacy interests; 4) his First Amendment associational
rights; and 5) the Bill of Attainder Clause.222 Because this section is only
concerned with presidential privileges, this discussion is limited to those
issues related to the presidential privilege doctrine.
Writing for the Court, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. stated that
President Nixon may only assert a privilege as to those materials which fall
within the scope of the privilege as recognized in United States v. Nixon.223
The Court stated that Nixon held that the privilege is limited to communica-
tions "'in performance of [a President's] responsibilities, of his office,"' and
made "'in the process of shaping policies and making decisions.' ' '224 The
Court denied President Nixon's claim of privilege, reasoning that section
104 of the Act directed the Administrator to take into account "'the need to
protect any party's opportunity to assert any.., constitutionally based right
or privilege"' and the need to return purely private materials to the Presi-
dent.225 The Court concluded that, "[i]n view of these specific directions,
there is no reason to believe that the restriction on public access ultimately
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. General Services, 433 U.S. at 425.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 425-26.
223. Id. at 449.
224. Id. (citations omitted).
225. General Services, 433 U.S. at 450 (citation omitted).
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established by regulation will not be adequate to preserve executive confi-
dentiality." 226 Ultimately, the Court reasoned:
[that] given the safeguards built into the Act to prevent disclosure
of such materials and the minimal nature of the intrusion into the
confidentiality of the Presidency, we believe that the claims of
Presidential privilege clearly must yield to the important congres-
sional purposes of preserving the materials and maintaining access
to them for lawful governmental and historical purposes. 227
Although Supreme Court opinions involving executive privilege cases
are sparse, the procedure involved in claiming and establishing the privilege
parallels those arguments advanced in Jones v. Clintonm in support of a
"temporary immunity." This presumptive privilege would entail halting all
civil legal process against a sitting President for the duration of his or her
tenure. A President may still be sued, but a presumption could be attached
where the plaintiff or President will have the burden to show why they
would be injured if the proceeding were continued or stayed.
IV. JONES V. CLINTON
A. Facts
On May 6, 1994, Paula Corbin Jones filed suit against President
William Jefferson Clinton and Arkansas State Trooper Danny Ferguson,
who was assigned to President Clinton's security detail during his tenure as
Arkansas' Governor.229  On May 8, 1991, the underlying incident was
alleged to have occurred in a Little Rock, Arkansas, hotel suite where
President Clinton, then Governor of Arkansas, delivered a speech at a
conference that day.230 According to the complaint, Trooper Danny Fergu-
son, President Clinton's bodyguard, delivered a piece of paper to Paula
Jones with a four digit number written down and said, "[t]he Governor
226. Id.
227. Id. at 454.
228. See 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996) The dissent argues that the plaintiff should have
the burden of proving why this litigation will not interfere with the President's duties, whereas
the concurrence argues that the President should bear the burden of establishing why this
litigation would interfere with real and established responsibilities. Id. (Ross J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 1357.
230. Id.
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would like to meet with you" in this suite number. 23' Jones, a rank-and-file
Arkansas state employee being paid approximately $6.35 per hour, thought it
was an honor to be asked to meet with the Governor.232 It was during this
encounter which Paula Jones alleges that President Clinton violated her
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process by sexually harass-
ing and assaulting her.233 She further alleges that Trooper Ferguson and Mr.
Clinton conspired to violate her constitutional rights.234 The Jones complaint
also asserts two supplemental state law claims, one against President Clinton
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the other against both
Trooper Ferguson and President Clinton for defamation.235 On June 10,
1994, Mr. Ferguson answered the complaint, admitting that he traveled in an
elevator with Paula Jones and pointed out a particular room of the hotel, but
that he had no knowledge of what took place in that room.
236
B. Prior History of Jones v. Clinton
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas,
Western Division, President Clinton asserted a claim of immunity from civil
suit and filed a motion to dismiss the complaint without prejudice to its
refiling when he is no longer President.237 In the alternative, he requested a
stay of the proceedings for as long as he remains President.238 On December
28, 1994, United States District Court Judge Susan Webber Wright denied
the sitting President of the United States absolute immunity during presiden-
tial service from civil suit for his unofficial acts. 239 Nevertheless, Judge
Wright did reason that the separation of powers doctrine entitled President
Clinton a "temporary or limited immunity from trial," thereby granting
President Clinton a stay of trial during his tenure as President.24° Judge
Wright also justified the stay on the basis of her authority under Rule 40 of
231. Complaint at 3, Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark. 1994) [hereinafter
Jones I].
232. Id.
233. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1357.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Answer of Danny Ferguson at 3-4, Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark.
1994).
237. Jones 1, 869 F. Supp. at 692.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 698.
240. Id. at 699.
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure241 and "the equity powers of the
Court."242 The court concluded that the claims against Trooper Ferguson
were so factually and legally intertwined with the claims of President
Clinton that the stay from trial also applied to Mr. Ferguson. However, the
court allowed discovery to go forward on Mrs. Jones' claims against both
defendants.243
President Clinton appealed the district court's decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, arguing that the court should
have dismissed the suit without prejudice to the refiling of Mrs. Jones' suit
when he is no longer President.244 President Clinton also challenged the
decision to permit discovery to proceed during the stay of trial. 245 Contem-
poraneously, Paula Jones cross-appealed, arguing that the stay entered by the
district court was in error, and the case should be allowed to proceed through
trial.2A
Writing for a divided panel, circuit Judge Bowman began with the
proposition that the President, like all other government officials, is subject
247to the same laws that apply to all other members of American society.
The appellate court rationally grounded its holding by stating that "[b]y
definition, unofficial acts are not within the perimeter of the President's
official responsibility at all, even the outer perimeter., 248  Therefore,
President Clinton's claim of immunity was not within the holding of Nixon
v. Fitzgerald.249 The appellate court continued, "[w]e thus are unable to read
Fitzgerald as support for the proposition that the separation of powers
doctrine provides immunity for the individual who serves as President from
lawsuits seeking to hold him accountable for his unofficial actions."0
Turning to the issue of temporary immunity, the appellate court cited
Marbury v. Madison2s1 for the proposition that "'[t]he very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protec-
241. See FED. R. Civ. P. 40 (allowing district courts to place actions upon its trial calen-
dar).
242. Jones 1, 869 F. Supp. at 699.
243. Id.
244. Jones 11, 72 F.3d at 1356.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1358.
248. Id. at 1359.
249. Jones 11, 72 F.3d at 1359.
250. Id.
251. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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tion of the laws, whenever he receives an injury,"' and the court stated that
"Mrs. Jones is constitutionally entitled to access to the courts and to the
equal protection of the laws."252 Judge Bowman reasoned:
Mrs. Jones's [sic] claims, except for her defamation claim, concern
actions by Mr. Clinton that, beyond cavil, are unrelated to his du-
ties as President. This lawsuit thus does not implicate presidential
decision-making. If this suit goes forward, the President still will
be able to carry out his duties without any concern that he might be
sued for damages by a constituent aggrieved by some official
presidential act. Though amenable to suit for his private acts, the
President retains the absolute immunity found in Fitzgerald for of-
ficial acts, and presidential decision-making will not be im-
paired 53
Thus, the court of appeals held that the Constitution does not provide a
sitting President with any immunity from civil actions based on unofficial,
pre-presidential actions.25 4 The case was remanded to the district court to lift
the stays and to allow Mrs. Jones' suit to proceed against President Clinton
and Trooper Ferguson.
2 55
In a special concurrence, circuit Judge Beam wrote separately to
express his conviction on three points "insufficiently discussed" by the
256dissent and Judge Bowman. First, Judge Beam discussed how the stay of
proceedings would affect Paula Jones' claim by justifiably realizing,
Ms. Jones faces real dangers of loss of evidence through the un-
foreseeable calamities inevitable with the passage of time .... If a
blanket stay is granted and discovery is precluded as suggested by
Mr. Clinton and his amicus, Ms. Jones will have no way ... to per-
petuate the testimony of any party or witness should they die or be-
come incompetent during the period the matter is held in abey-
ance .... Thus, her "chose in action" would be obliterated, or at
least substantially damaged if she is denied reasonable and timely
access to the workings of the federal tribunal. 7
252. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1360 (citation omitted).
253. Id. (footnote omitted).
254. Id. at 1363.
255. Id.
256. Id. (Beam J., concurring specially).
257. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1363-64.
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Judge Beam continued his analysis by addressing the dissent's conten-
tion that the burden of proof establishing "'irreparable injury"' along with a
showing "'that the immediate adjudication of the suit will not significantly
impair the President's ability to attend to the duties of his office"' should lie
with Ms. Jones2 8 Judge Beam reasoned that "a litigant could [n]ever
successfully shoulder the burden assigned by the dissent, especially if all
discovery is prohibited."' 59 Rather, the burden should be upon "the party
seeking to delay the usual course of discovery and trial" as in any other civil
litigation.26°
Next, Judge Beam discussed the impact this litigation could have on the
President. After citing to numerous instances where an incumbent President
has been subject to judicial actions, Judge Beam reasoned that since these
previous Presidents had managed to schedule "these encounters without
creating a cataclysmic episode in which the constitutional duties of the office
have been compromised," accordingly, President Clinton could similarly
manage his duties of office while following discovery requests based on an
uncomplicated civil litigation.261 Moreover, the trial judge's careful supervi-
sion of the litigation can make certain that discovery requests are "carried
out with a minimum of impact on the President's schedule."
262
Judge Beam then turned his concern to Trooper Danny Ferguson. Judge
Beam discussed how he could find "no separation of powers or other
constitutional basis for a stay" for the claims against Trooper Ferguson.263
Judge Beam concluded that:
Judge Bowman's opinion reasonably charts a fair course through
the competing constitutional waters and does so without serious
injury to the rights of any party. As I have attempted to stress,
nothing prohibits the trial judge from halting or delaying or re-
scheduling any proposed action by any party at any time should she
find that the duties of the presidency are even slightly imperiled. 264
Despite these rational and legally based opinions, circuit Judge Ross
dissented from the majority opinion. Judge Ross would have held that,
258. Id. at 1364 (citation omitted).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1366.
262. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1366.
263. Id. at 1367.
264. Id.
10031997]
35
Williams: Temporary Immunity: Distinguishing Case Law Opinions for Executiv
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
"unless exigent circumstances can be shown, private actions for damages
against a sitting President of the United States, even though based on
unofficial acts, must be stayed until the completion of the President's
term. 265 After reiterating the holding and public policy arguments advanced
in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,2 66 Judge Ross argued, "[w]hile the majority would
encourage other courts to exercise 'judicial case management sensitive to the
burdens of the presidency,' ... only a stay of civil litigation during a
President's term in office will ensure the performance of Executive duties
unencumbered by the judiciary and thereby avoid separation of powers
conflicts., 267 Judge Ross reasoned:
Where there is no urgency to pursue a suit for civil damages,
the proper course is to avoid opportunities for breaching separation
of powers altogether by holding the litigation in abeyance until a
President leaves office. The cause of action should be stayed unless
the plaintiff can show that he or she will suffer irreparable injury
without immediate relief and that the immediate adjudication of the
suit will not significantly impair the President's ability to attend to
the duties of his office.
It is important to keep in mind that the issue here is not
whether the President may be required to answer claims based on
unofficial conduct, but when. This conclusion merely delays,
rather than defeats, the vindication of the plaintiff's private legal
interests, and thus is far less burdensome for a plaintiff than the ab-
solute immunity recognized in Fitzgerald. A stay for the duration
of the President's service in office would not prevent Jones from
ultimately obtaining an adjudication of her claims. Rather, staying
the litigation will protect the important public and constitutional
interests in the President's unimpaired performance of his duties,
while preserving a plaintiff's ability to obtain resolution of his or
her claims on the merits.26
Additionally, Judge Ross reasoned that a stay of the proceedings against
Trooper Ferguson is "essential if the President is to be fully protected. 269
Judge Ross insisted:
265. Id. at 1367 (Ross J., dissenting).
266. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
267. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1369 (quoting Bowman J., majority opinion).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1370.
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[that he] would hold that to rebut the presumption that private suits
against a sitting President should not go forward during the Presi-
dent's service in office, the plaintiff should have to demonstrate
convincingly both that delay will seriously prejudice the plaintiff's
interests and that immediate adjudication of the suit will not sig-
nificantly impair the President's ability to attend to the duties of his
office. Absent such a showing, the litigation should be deferred.270
In Judge Ross's opinion, "the stay should include pretrial discovery, as
well as the trial proceedings, because discovery is likely to pose even more
intrusive and burdensome demands on the President's time and attention
than the eventual trial itself."271
C. Current Status of Jones v. Clinton
On May 15, 1996, President Clinton petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.272 The first of two questions pre-
sented was whether the incumbent President is entitled to immunity, for the
duration of his Presidency, from a civil suit for damages for his unofficial
actions. The second question is whether the district court properly exercised
its discretion by granting a stay of trial until the President leaves office.
President Clinton's counsel, Robert S. Bennett, stated four reasons for
granting the petition. Counsel claimed that the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals is inconsistent with previous Supreme Court decisions and
jeopardizes the separation of powers doctrine.273 Counsel contended that
"[c]ourts traditionally have recognized the President's constitutional respon-
sibilities and status as factors counseling judicial deference and restraint."274
Counsel presumed that the court of appeals "concluded that because the
Fitzgerald holding was limited to civil damages claims challenging official
acts, the President should receive no form of protection from any other civil
suits," which is completely "inconsistent with the reasoning of Fitzger-
ald."275 Counsel persisted:
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1369-70.
272. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Clinton v. Jones, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996) (No. 95-1050) [hereinafter Petition].
273. Id. at 9.
274. Id. (citing Nixon, 457 U.S. at 749).
275. Id.
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[t]he Court in Fitzgerald determined that the President was entitled
to absolute immunity not only because the threat of liability for of-
ficial acts might inhibit him in the exercise of his authority, but also
because, in the Court's words, 'the singular importance of the
President's duties' means that 'diversion of his energies by concern
with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective func-
tioning of government.'
276
Thus, the President's counsel places unwieldy emphasis upon this second
policy argument, and concluded that the Court of Appeals "ignored this
second basis for the holding of Fitzgerald.,
277
Next, Mr. Bennett argued that the Court of Appeals erred by viewing
the relief sought by the President as extraordinary.278 As support for this
proposition, counsel maintained that, "[t]here are numerous instances where
civil plaintiffs are required to accept the temporary postponement of litiga-
tion so that important institutional or public interests can be protected." 279
Three examples are advanced in support of this proposition. First, the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940280 grants military personnel
the right to toll or stay civil claims while they are on active duty. Therefore,
"President Clinton here thus seeks relief similar to that to which he may be
entitled as Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces., 28  Next,
[t]he so-called automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code
similarly provides that litigation against a debtor is to be stayed as
soon as a party files a bankruptcy petition. Thus, if [Paula Jones]
had sued a party who entered bankruptcy, [she] would automati-
cally find herself in the same position she will be in if the President
prevails before this Court--except that the bankruptcy stay is in-
definite, while the stay in this case has a definite term, circum-
scribed by the constitutional limit on a President's tenure in of-
fice. 21
2
276. Id. (citing Nixon 457 U.S. at 751-52).
277. Petition at 10, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
278. Id. at 14.
279. Id.
280. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. app. § 521 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993).
281. Petition at 14-15, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
282. Id. at 15.
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Lastly, courts may "put off civil litigation until the conclusion of a related
criminal prosecution against the same defendant." 283 As a result, counsel
argued that "these examples thoroughly dispel any suggestion that the
President, in asking that this litigation be deferred, is somehow placing
himself 'above the law,' or that holding this litigation in abeyance would
impermissibly violate a plaintiff's entitlement to access to the courts." 24
Next, it is argued that the court of appeals erred in asserting jurisdiction
over, and reversing, the district court's discretionary decision to stay the trial
until after the President leaves office. s Mr. Bennett reasoned:
The question of whether the President is entitled, as a matter of
law, to defer this litigation is analytically distinct from the question
of whether a district court may exercise its discretion to stay all or
part of the litigation ... the latter is a discretionary determination
to be made on the basis of the particular facts of the case. More-
over,... a court's exercise of discretion to stay proceedings is a
determination that can be overturned only for abuse of that discre-
tion. The panel majority's expansion of the court of appeals' juris-
diction over [Paula Jones'] interlocutory appeal was in error. 86
Counsel concluded that the appellate court never conducted "the kind of
careful weighing of the particular facts and circumstances that might warrant
a conclusion that the trial court here abused its discretion. 2s
Finally, the President's attorney made an argument that the Supreme
Court should grant review now in order to protect the interests of the
Presidency.2 s Counsel reasoned, "Now, a court for the first time in history
has held that a sitting President is required to defend a private civil damages
action." 289 Ending his arguments, counsel reasoned:
There is no question that the issues raised by this case will have
profound consequences for both the Presidency and the Judiciary.
The last word on issues of this importance should not be a decision
by a splintered panel of a court of appeals--a decision that is incon-
283. Id.
284. Id. at 16.
285. Id.
286. Petition at 17-19, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
287. Id. at 19.
288. Id. at 20.
289. Id.
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sistent with the precedents of this Court and with the constitutional
tradition of separation of powers.
290
Therefore, counsel pleaded for the Supreme Court to grant the President's
petition for writ of certiorari.
On May 17 of 1996, Attorney Gilbert K. Davis, Paula Corbin Jones'
counsel, responded in opposition to President Clinton's petition for writ of
certiorari.2 9' Mr. Davis reinforced three reasons why the Supreme Court
should deny the petition. His first declaration bolsters the argument that this
case in no way possesses any consequential threat to the functioning of the
executive branch. Mr. Davis reiterates that this case is "a very simple
dispute about what happened in a very short encounter between two people,"
and quite possibly the least burdensome case a President may ever face.2 92
Gilbert Davis argues that President Clinton has "sought to advance his
argument that this litigation might 'interfere with [his] constitutionally
assigned duties ... without detailing any specific responsibilities or ex-
plaining how or the degree to which they are affected by the suit.' 2 93 As
counsel made clear:
In the 220-year history of the Republic, there apparently have been
"only three prior instances in which sitting Presidents have been
involved in litigation concerning their acts outside official presi-
dential duties." The historical record reveals no claims of any
presidential hardship in these cases, let alone any claims of presi-
dential immunities.
2 94
Concluding that President Clinton failed to raise any concrete issue as to any
institutional interference with the Presidency, Mr. Davis reasoned that the
President shows neither the extent to which this litigation would violate the
separation of powers nor how the executive branch would be prevented from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.295
Mr. Gilbert's second argument attacks the President's contention that
this litigation comes within the immunity doctrine espoused in Nixon v.
290. Id. at 21.
291. Brief for Respondent at 24, Clinton v. Jones, 72 F. 3d 1354 (8th Cir.), cert. granted,
116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996) (No. 95-1050).
292. Id. at 10.
293. Id.
294. Id. at I 1 (citation omitted).
295. Id. at 14.
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Fitzgerald.2 9 6 Counsel argued that the President is not entitled, as a matter
of law, to defer this litigation, because the acts complained of are not within
the outer perimeter of his official duties.2 7 Mr. Davis stated that "Mr.
Clinton consistently styled his claim as one of immunity. He has now
dropped that word, but the relief he seeks is effectively the same."
298
Following counsel's logic, he stated:
[N]otwithstanding [the President's] advocacy of discretionary
stays, he still contends that under Nixon v. Fitzgerald he is
"entitled, as a matter of law, to defer this litigation" for the remain-
der of his presidency. That is essentially the argument for presi-
dential immunity... [but] [i]n more than a century of immunity
decisions, from Bradley v. Fisher, to Fitzgerald, this Court has not
once suggested that a public official could avoid litigation of a case
involving only unofficial acts. To the contrary, as Chief Justice
Burger's concurrence in Fitzgerald repeatedly stressed, the Court's
cases have always presumed that protection of public officials from
suit covers only official actions and "does not extend beyond such
actions"-that "a President, like Members of Congress, judges,
prosecutors, or congressional aides... [is] not immune for acts
outside official duties." It was precisely that limitation that al-
lowed Chief Justice Burger to declare that Fitzgerald did not place
[the] President "above the law."2 99
Counsel concluded that nothing within the Fitzgerald opinion grants or
even suggests that a President, when acting personally, has any immunity,
neither qualified nor absolute. Counsel reasoned that to extend immunity
here "would contravene the Nation's egalitarian civic creed and the Consti-
tution's guarantee of equal protection of the laws.,,300 As the appeals court
reasoned, Article II of the United States Constitution certainly did not create
a monarchy.
301
Counsel argued that the appeals court, in a proper exercise of jurisdic-
tion, correctly reversed the district court's grant of temporary immunity from
trial and its stay of proceedings. 30 2 Counsel reasoned that the appeals court
296. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
297. Brief for Respondent at 14, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 15-16 (citations omitted).
300. Id. at 18.
301. Id.
302. Brief for Respondent at 20, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
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correctly determined that what the district court ordered, a postponement of
trial, was "the functional equivalent of a grant of temporary immunity."
303
Even though the trial court had the power to stay proceedings, "the District
Court's decision was a manifest abuse of discretion. '' ° Mr. Gilbert stressed
that when the district court granted trial immunity to President Clinton, the
court made no finding that the President even attempted to make a showing
of an actual and "clear case of hardship," as required to stay a proceeding.
30 5
The appellate court's ruling was proper, despite the district court's recitation
of Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedurea°6 and the court's equity
powers, because the district court's order was based upon its erroneous
holding that Mr. Clinton was entitled to "immunity from trial as Fitzgerald
seems to require.
3°7
Despite Mr. Gilbert's arguments espousing the correct scope of the
cases mentioned herein, on June 24 of 1996, the Supreme Court of the
United States granted President Clinton's petition for writ of certiorari.30 8
V. PRESIDENTIAL PRIVILEGE
If the Supreme Court extends any protection to President Clinton
according to the circumstances underlying Jones, then, initially, there must
be a determination made to precisely label the form of relief sought by the
President. President Clinton hopes to persuade the Supreme Court to
recognize some form of immunity, applicable only to the office of the
President. However, all rational analyses seem to weight heavily in Paula
Jones' favor when distinguishing the circumstances involved in Jones to the
holding and policy arguments advanced in Nixon.30 9 According to Nixon,
presidential immunity attaches to broad official actions within the scope of a
President's responsibility. 310 The more narrow functional approach to the
immunity doctrine extends to grant officials immunity only for acts within
the functions provided to that particular official's discretion and responsi-
bilities. Regardless, President Clinton petitions the Supreme Court to
provide the office of the President monumental protection from practically
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 21.
306. FED. R. Civ. P. 40.
307. Brief for Respondent at 21, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
308. 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996).
309. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
310. Id. at 756.
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all phases of a civil litigation, from discovery through trial, until the Presi-
dent leaves office.
Contrary to the holdings of every executive immunity case, President
Clinton's claim arises from actions prior to his Presidency and completely
outside of any functional or discretionary executive action taken by then
Governor Clinton. If any other citizen, executive official, judge, or legislator
were to argue immunity from trial, then summary judgment would have
surely put an end to such a claim, because President Clinton's actions were
outside of any broad zone of an official's duties or responsibilities. Never-
theless, the Chief Executive of the United States is not just one person in one
office representing one department, but rather one person representing an
entire branch of government. For this reason alone, the office of the Presi-
dent is definitely unique and merits some form of protection from disruptive
lawsuits.
However, any claim of immunity by President Clinton is erroneous.
Both qualified and absolute immunity, if granted, permanently bars a
plaintiff's civil damages action. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,3 11 the Second Circuit's test to determine
whether an official's actions were within the established immunity doctrine,
required that it must first be determined whether the official was acting
"'within the outer perimeter of his line of duty.' 3 12 The holding in Nixon
established this identical limit upon claims of presidential immunity.
313
Clearly, President Clinton's claim of a temporary immunity for pre-
presidential, unofficial actions immediately fails under any established
immunity doctrine, definition, or test.
In reality, what President Clinton seeks to avoid is the rigorous judicial
process only during his tenure as President. President Clinton claims that he
and all future Presidents should be entitled to some form of protection for
the purpose of being unencumbered while in the execution of Article II
responsibilities. This claim has policy merit due to the possibility that the
overwhelming exposure of the President makes him "an easily identifiable
target for suits for civil damages[,]" and consequently, could frequently
"distract a President from his public duties, to the detriment of not only the
President and his office but also the Nation that the Presidency was designed
to serve. 314
311. 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
312. Id. at 1343 (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959)).
313. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 756.
314. Id. at 753.
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President Clinton's ultimate relief is more akin to the term "presidential
privilege" rather than "temporary immunity." Logically, Mr. Clinton's relief
should be termed a privilege, because supporters argue that this temporary
immunity should be presumptive with a burden of proof for either the
plaintiff or President to establish. 315  This presumptiveness parallels the
procedure established for claims based on executive privilege.316 Moreover,
the President's ultimate relief is definitely not any form of an immunity,
because, by definition, it is temporary and of a fixed duration.317 On the
other hand, every single grant of immunity has permanently barred the
underlying claim. Therefore, how can the President's requested relief be
termed "temporary immunity?" The term "temporary immunity" is an
oxymoron and absolutely unsuited for any intelligent constitutional analysis.
Additionally, President Clinton's relief is exclusively presidential, because
all policy arguments supporting President Clinton's claim focus upon the
Article II responsibilities and unique office of the Presidency. Therefore,
any temporary relief granted to the office of the Presidency should be
entitled presidential privilege, because Clinton's position parallels executive
privilege cases while his basic argument focuses on the uniqueness of the
oval office.
Rationalizing the arguments advanced, both pro and con, for President
Clinton's claim of a presidential privilege, one must recall that these
arguments were advanced in both executive immunity and executive privi-
lege cases. According to Judge Ross' dissent in Jones, "unless exigent
circumstances can be shown, private actions for damages against a sitting
President of the United States, even though based on unofficial acts, must be
stayed until the completion of the President's term."318 Thus, Judge Ross
would allow the President a presumptive privilege, which can only be
countered with a showing of exigent circumstances. Judge Ross' test
parallels that espoused in the Reynolds and Nixon cases. In Reynolds, the
Court championed the procedure involved in assessing an executive privi-
315. See Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 (1996) (presenting conflicting opinions as both
the concurrence and the dissent argue whether the plaintiff or the president should bear the
burden of proof).
316. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1953) (concluding that the person
alleging the privilege must make a formal claim of privilege, and then, the opposing party
must rebut any presumption of privilege).
317. See Petition at 15, Clinton (No. 95-1050) (arguing that a stay in this case has a
definite term based on the constitutional limit on a president's tenure in office).
318. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1367 (Ross J., dissenting).
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lege issue. First, there must be a formal claim of privilege.319 Thus, it is
entirely proper to initially rule that a plaintiff has shown probable cause for
the discovery of privileged information. 320  Thereafter, when the formal
claim of privilege is asserted, it must be determined if there is a sufficient
showing of privilege to cut off further demand for the privileged informa-
tion. 21 President Clinton is not asserting an absolute immunity from civil
process, but a qualified privilege against compelled participation in the
process while in office. As a result, a President can be served process and be
subjected to judicial process. However, once a President asserts a formal
presidential privilege claim, then it must be determined if there is a suffi-
cient showing of privilege to cut off further demand for the privileged
information.
In United States v. Nixon,322 the Court weighed the competing interests
at stake and concluded that a President's generalized interest in confidenti-
ality of communications'does not prevail over fundamental demands of due
process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.323 Hence, Judge
Ross' test parallels the procedures and balancing of interests used by the
Supreme Court to evaluate a claim of executive privilege because a President
bears the burden of establishing the privilege while the court balances the
competing interests. President Clinton does not assert that he is always
immune from this type of suit, rather that the office itself holds the privilege.
Thus, presidential privilege is a President's claim of constitutional authority
to withhold information, not from the legislative and judicial branches, but
from a civil plaintiff while the President remains in office, provided that the
President's interest for the privilege relates to the effective discharge of
executive powers.
VI. STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
The trial court in Jones v. Clinton granted the President "temporary or
limited immunity from trial" on the basis of the court's discretion and equity
powers. 324 Yet, the appellate court debated whether the plaintiff or the
President should bear the "burden of showing specific hardship or inequity if
319. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 10-11.
322. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
323. Id. at711-13.
324. Jones I, 869 F. Supp. at 699.
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he or she is required to go forward. 325 If the Supreme Court grants Presi-
dent Clinton a presidential privilege to stay any proceedings of this matter
during the President's tenure in office, then the Supreme Court must address
whether the trial court has the power and discretion to grant a stay of trial,
and whether the plaintiff or President must shoulder any burden of proof.
A. The Trial Court
President Clinton's counsel cites Landis v. North American Co., 32 6 in
support of the trial court's discretion to stay the trial. Writing for the Court
in Landis, Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo reasoned:
[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent
in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket
with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for liti-
gants .... True, the suppliant for a stay must make out a clear case
of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is
even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work
damage to some one else.
327
The Landis Court went on to state:
Especially in cases of extraordinary public moment, the individual
may be required to submit to delay not immoderate in extent and
not oppressive in its consequences if the public welfare or con-
venience will thereby be promoted .... Even so, the burden of
making out the justice and wisdom of a departure from the beaten
track lay heavily on the petitioners, suppliants for relief, and dis-
cretion was abused if the stay was not kept within the bounds of
moderation. 32
8
Nonetheless, this case concerned the power of a court to stay proceed-
ings in one suit until the decision of an identical suit in another court is
rendered. 329 Therefore, the Landis decision is distinguishable here, because
Paula Jones has filed only one suit in federal court.
President Clinton argued, in his petition for writ of certiorari, that the
trial court's discretionary "decision to postpone trial - unlike review of its
325. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1364.
326. 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
327. Id. at 254-55.
328. Id. at 256.
329. Id. at 249.
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decision to reject the President's position that the entire case should be
deferred as a matter of law - must address these particular facts of this
case."'33  Additionally, "[t]he panel majority justified its reversal of the
district court with a single sentence in a footnote... [and] it is unclear what
the panel meant by labeling the district court's order the 'functional equiva-
lent' of 'temporary immunity. ''3 31 Thus, "in its sweeping and conclusory
ruling, [the appellate court] did not begin to conduct the kind of careful
weighing of the particular facts and circumstances that might warrant a
conclusion that the trial court here abused its discretion."
332
Countering this argument, Paula Jones' counsel contested the Presi-
dent's claim by asserting that "Mr. Clinton misconstrues" the Landis case.
333
After reciting the holding in Landis, counsel argued that "a stay of litigation
may be granted '[o]nly in rare circumstances.' '334 Counsel contended that
the appellate court was faithful to the holding in Landis when they properly
reversed the trial court's postponement of trial.335 Counsel reasoned:
In granting trial "immunity" to Mr. Clinton, the District Court
made no finding that Mr. Clinton had made a showing of an actual
and "clear case of hardship," a showing not even attempted. As
Judge Beam explained, moreover, the danger of harm to Ms. Jones
was manifest: she "faces real dangers of loss of evidence through
the unforeseeable calamities inevitable with the passage of time."
336
And the passage of time contemplated by the District Court's or-
der-possibly into the next century-was surely immoderate. In-
deed, in Landis itself, the Court found "the limits of a fair discre-
tion" to have been "exceeded" by a stay that had suspended "the
proceedings in the District Court... more than a year."337 And
since the "stay," despite the District Court's citation of FED. R.
Crv. P. 40 and the court's equity powers, was dependent upon its
erroneous holding that Mr. Clinton was entitled to an "immunity
330. Petition at 18, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
331. Id. at 19 (quoting Jones 11, 72 F.3d at 1361).
332. Id.
333. Brief for Respondent at 20, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
334. Id. at 21 (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 255).
335. Id.
336. Id. (citing Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1364).
337. Id. (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 256).
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from trial as Fitzgerald seems to require," it was properly reversed
for that error as well.338
Accordingly, Paula Jones argued that the decision rendered in the appellate
court was correct, and her case should proceed against Mr. Clinton and
Trooper Ferguson.
Due to the fact that a trial court has the power to control its docket, the
Supreme Court will have to determine whether the district court properly
exercised its discretion to stay the trial until President Clinton leaves office.
On this same issue, the appellate court stated:
The discretion of the courts in suits such as this one comes into
play, not in deciding on a case-by-case basis whether a civil com-
plaint alleging private wrongs is sufficiently compelling so as to be
permitted to proceed with an incumbent President as defendant, but
in controlling the scheduling of the case as necessary to avoid inter-
ference with specific, particularized, clearly articulated presidential
duties. If the trial preliminaries or the trial itself become barriers to
the effective performance of his official duties, Mr. Clinton's rem-
edy is to pursue motions for rescheduling, additional time, or con-
tinuances.
339
Thus, the court's justification is to allow the trial court to use its
discretionary functions to protect the President when there is a clear and
actual conflict between Presidential duties and the judicial process, not a
wholesale grant of immunity from trial while sitting as President.
B. Burden of Proof
Writing his dissent for the appellate court, Judge Ross reasoned that
"[t]he burdens and demands of civil litigation can be expected to impinge on
the President's discharge of his constitutional office by forcing him to divert
his energy and attention from the rigorous demands of his office to the task
of protecting himself against personal liability." 34° Thus, circuit Judge Ross
asserted that "[t]he cause of action should be stayed unless the plaintiff can
show that he or she will suffer irreparable injury without immediate relief
and that the immediate adjudication of the suit will not significantly impair
338. Brief for Respondent at 21, Clinton (No. 95-1050) (citing Jones I, 869 F. Supp. at
699).
339. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1362-63.
340. Id. at 1367 (Ross, J., dissenting).
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the President's ability to attend to the duties of his office." 341 However,
Judge Ross cites no authority nor any public policy arguments to support his
proposition for shifting the burden onto the plaintiff.
Subsequently, circuit Judge Beam, writing a special concurrence for the
court, specifically stated that:
The dissent cites no established authority or case precedent for this
burden-shifting strategy, even by analogy to some reasonably com-
parable situation. I have discovered none. In this regard, there is
no way, in my view, that a litigant could ever successfully shoulder
the burden assigned by the dissent, especially if all discovery is
prohibited. [T]he burden... should be shouldered, as in any other
civil litigation, by the party seeking to delay the usual course of
discovery and trial. Otherwise, we will have established require-
ments of insurmountable proportions for any litigant who may have
a viable and urgent civil claim against a sitting President or per-
haps, against other important governmental figures with constitu-
tionally established duties.
This approach to staying litigation is a well-established legal
concept.
342
Judge Beam reiterated that the traditional approach espoused in Landis
established that the person applying for the stay has the burden of showing
any specific hardship or inequity before the court will grant any stay of the
proceedings.343 If the Supreme Court follows the traditional approach, then
President Clinton will have the burden of establishing a stay from proceed-
ings.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court granted President Clinton's petition for
certiorari, the Justices must determine whether President Clinton is entitled
to a presidential privilege against civil process during his tenure for alleg-
edly unofficial, pre-presidential actions. Paula Jones' allegations have lost
the attention of Americans, but the issues now involved are quite real and
will impact the Presidency for the immediate and foreseeable future. In this
341. Id. at 1369.
342. Id. at 1364 (Beam, J., concurring specially).
343. Id.
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regard, one should not take lightly the allegations advanced; rather, one
should focus upon the issues raised by Paula Jones and President Clinton.
If the Supreme Court grants President Clinton a presidential privilege
against compelled civil process, then the King cannot be wrong while
occupying the oval office. Consequently, the doctrine of presidential
immunity may encounter a ripple-effect, whereby the historic functional
approach may be altered in favor of public policy concerns for an unimpeded
Presidency. As a result, the last quasi-judicial process available will be the
process of impeachment. But due to the conflicting views in the appellate
court's decision on who should bear the burden of proof, the Supreme Court
may have to address this issue. If Landis is controlling, then President
Clinton will bear any burden of proving that this litigation will harm his
ability to function as President.
If the Supreme Court follows stare decisis and applies the holding in
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, then the appellate court's decision may stand. Since
President Clinton's alleged actions are pre-presidential, any application of
the holding in Nixon v. Fitzgerald will result in a denial of the President's
claim for relief. Thus, Paula Jones will be able to claim the protection of the
laws against a sitting President, whenever injury results. In the end, every
person interested should hope that justice will prevail, and Paula Jones will
soon get her day in court.
The Supreme Court may extend to the Presidency a new presidential
privilege, effectively carving out a constitutional exception applicable only
to the presidential office. Contemporary pressures upon the Presidency may
favor a policy of allowing the President unimpeded civil protection to
perform his or her Article II duties. However, the Court is more likely to
take Chief Justice Burger's view in United States v. Nixon, that this new
presidential privilege will gravely impair the role of the courts under Article
344III and upset the constitutional balance of powers.
Glenn T. Williams
344. 418 U.S. at 707.
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